2020-02-04

Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda - ScienceDirect

Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda - ScienceDirect:

 

Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E.Campbell Jerry S.Kelly 
Show more
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024Get rights and content


 
Abstract
There are two feasible alternatives. We impose a weak version of anonymity on an arbitrary social choice function, which selects a single alternative at each profile. It implies majority rule in the presence of neutrality and monotonicity.
Research Highlights
► There are two feasible alternatives. Partial anonymity imposes the standard anonymity condition only on profiles where the number of individuals who are not indifferent is odd. ► Theorem 1: Every social choice function satisfying monotonicity, neutrality, and partial anonymity is a majority rule. ► If individuals are never indifferent between distinct alternatives then a variable population model is used to derive majority rule. ► Theorem 2: If the social choice function: L⟶X satisfies neutrality, partial anonymity, and extended monotonicity then it is a majority rule.

2017-06-02

[학술활동] Game Theory Workshop at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management

Cooperative Game Theory in Business Practice
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management

6월 14일 출국
15일 Workshop Day 1 [presentation: Sharing revenues on hierarchies (with Soojeong Jung, Hokyu Song)]
16일 Workshop Day 2
17일 Meeting with Andre Casajus, Frank Huettner
18일 귀국