Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
Donald E.Campbell Jerry S.Kelly
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024Get rights and content
There are two feasible alternatives. We impose a weak version of anonymity on an arbitrary social choice function, which selects a single alternative at each profile. It implies majority rule in the presence of neutrality and monotonicity.
► There are two feasible alternatives. Partial anonymity imposes the standard anonymity condition only on profiles where the number of individuals who are not indifferent is odd. ► Theorem 1: Every social choice function satisfying monotonicity, neutrality, and partial anonymity is a majority rule. ► If individuals are never indifferent between distinct alternatives then a variable population model is used to derive majority rule. ► Theorem 2: If the social choice function: L⟶X satisfies neutrality, partial anonymity, and extended monotonicity then it is a majority rule.