Priority, solidarity and egalitarianism

Social Choice and Welfare

February 2014

·        Youngsub Chun, 

·        Inkee Jang, 

·        Biung-Ghi Ju

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We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427, 2006) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are disability monotonicity (no reduction in the amount of resources allocated to an agent after she becomes more disabled) and agreement (when there is a change in agents’ capabilities or total resources, all agents who remain unchanged should be influenced in the same direction: all unchanged agents get more or all get less or all get the same amount as before).


Within this Article

1.      Introduction

2.      Preliminaries

3.      Axioms

4.      Main results

5.      Concluding remarks

6.      References

7.      References

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The 12th meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare

The 12th meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare  
June 18-21, 2014, Boston College

Keynote speakers:
Arrow Lecture by Daron Acemoglu (MIT) ,  Condorcet Lecture by Parag Pathak (MIT) ,
Presidential Address by  Bhaskar Dutta (U. Warwick),
Social Choice and Welfare Prize Lectures by
Vincent Conitzer (Duke U.) and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford U.)

Submissions: from January 1st till March 1st, 2014. 
The program will be announced by April 1st , 2014.

Program committee:
Tommy Andersson (U. Lund), Carmen Bevia (Autonomous U. of Barcelona), Peter Biro (Hungary Academy of Science), Olivier Bochet (NYU Abu Dhabi, University of Bern), Anna Bogomolnaia (U. Glasgow), Felix Brandt (Technical U. Munich), Eric Budish (U. Chicago), Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown U.), Amrita Dhillon (King’s College London), John Duggan (U. Rochester), Marc Fleurbaey (Princeton U.), Takashi Hayashi (U. Glasgow), Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research), Biung-Ghi Ju (Seoul National U.), Scott Kominers (Harvard U.), Michel Le Breton (U. Toulouse), Cesar Martinelli (ITAM), Vikram Manjunath (U. Montreal), Hans Peters (Maastricht U.), Toyotaka Sakai (Keio U.), Uzi Segal (Boston College), Arunava Sen (Indian Statistical Institute), Rodrigo Velez (Texas A&M U.), Bumin Yenmez (Carnegie Mellon U.), Huseyin Yildirim (Duke U.), Stephane Zuber (Paris School of Economics)

The list of topics covered by the conference includes (but is not limited to): preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting.  During this conference, special sessions will be devoted to “Aging and Intergenerational Equity”, “Market Design”, “Computational Social Choice” and “Political Economy”.

Local organization committee:
Hideo Konishi (hideo.konishi@bc.edu), Utku Unver (unver@bc.edu)

As a subsequent event, Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver give lectures on Market Design on June 22, 2014. 
For further information, please see:  http://www.bc.edu/scw14